S cientific progress is driven by innovation-which serves to produce a diversity of ideas-and imitation through a social network-which serves to diffuse these ideas. In this paper, we develop an agent-based computational model of this process, in which the agents in the population are heterogeneous in their abilities to innovate and imitate. The model incorporates three primary forces: the discovery of new ideas, the observation and adoption of these ideas, and the endogenous development of networks. The objective is to explore the evolving architecture of problem-solving networks and the critical roles that different agents play in the process. A central finding is that the emergent network takes a chain structure with innovators (those most skilled at generating new ideas) being the main source of ideas and those most skilled at imitating acting as connectors between the innovators and the masses. The impact of agent heterogeneity and environmental volatility on the network architecture is also characterized.
Introduction
The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century is often attributed to the genius of a few solitary innovators. The archival records from this period, however, reveal that the social dimensions of the revolutionfor example, the social networks that connected these scientists through time and space-were just as critical in bringing the revolution to its ultimate victory (Hunter 1998) . Hatch (1998) describes the extensive correspondence networks that were established and operated by a few human connectors during this period. These social connectors included N.-C. Fabri de Peiresc (1580 -1637 ), Marin Mersenne (1588 -1648 ), Samuel Hartlib (c. 1600 -1662 ), Ismaël Boulliau (1605 -1694 , and Henry Oldenburg (1618-1677). Although they did not originate the paradigm-shifting ideas themselves, as connectors they facilitated the wide dissemination of ideas through communication networks of influential acquaintances and contacts. Hatch's description of Boulliau's network hints at the expanse over which the networks operated as well as the extent to which they were used: "Embracing the humanist ideal of community and communication, [Ismaël] Boulliau established a decidedly scientific and European network.
Boulliau's correspondence network included some 4,200 letters for the years 1632-93; [it] marks a critical transition in geographical distribution, which now extended beyond France, Holland, and Italy, to Poland, Scandinavia, and the Levant" (Hatch 1998, p. 55) . In fact, luminaries such as Galileo, Huygens, Dupuy, Mersenne, Oldenburg, and Fermat were all connected to Boulliau's network. Hull (1988) , in proposing an evolutionary model of the dynamic process by which scientific progress is made, positions these social connectors at center stage with the innovators:
According to the model that I am proposing, both discovery and dissemination are necessary As Lamarck (1809, p. 404) ruefully concluded his Philosophie zoologique, "Men who strive in their works to push back the limits of human knowledge know well that it is not enough to discover and prove a useful truth previously unknown, but that it is necessary also to be able to propagate it and get it recognized." If science is a selection process, transmission is necessary. Disseminators are operative in this process. Perhaps they do not get the ceremonial citations that patron saints do, but they are liable to get much more in the way of substantive citations
To the extent that disseminators substitute their own views for the patron saints whom they cite ceremoniously, they are functioning as germ-line parasitesthe cowbirds of science. (Hull 1988, pp. 376-377) Knowledge sharing through informal networks is not only relevant to grand questions in science, but also to everyday problem solving in organizations. Many organizational studies have documented the significant role that networks play in both sharing current knowledge and contributing to the creation of new knowledge (see Cross and Parker 2004 , and the collection of papers in Cross et al. 2003) . In one study, managers reported that information from other people is far more instrumental in a project's success than that gained from impersonal sources such as knowledge databases (Cross et al. 2001 ).
Furthermore, within this network of information sources, middle-level managers are critical for facilitating information flow even though the formal hierarchy would not have suggested such a significant role. Given the high centrality of some agents in problem-solving networks, research has begun to explore the characteristics of these connectors (see, for example, Borgatti and Cross 2003, 1 Klein et al. 2004, Uzzi and Dunlap 2005) .
The empirical literature then finds that networks are instrumental in problem solving and that some agents have high centrality and act as connectors within the network. These observations generate a number of questions. Although there are agents with high centrality, how critical are they to the group's performance? If agents are acting in a decentralized manner, can we generally expect connectors to emerge? In other words, is their emergence typical or rare? What factors determine whether connectors emerge? What are the characteristics of connectors? Are connectors just people who, through happenstance, find themselves in a position of centrality, which then perpetuates itself-people link with connectors because connectors have a lot of knowledge, but the reason they have a lot of knowledge is that people link with them-or do connectors have special skills attuned to playing this role? Related to this point, Sparrowe et al. (2001) find that agents with higher centrality have higher individual performance. But what is the causal relationship between these variables? Is this due to the agent's centrality resulting in higher performance, or do these individuals have certain fundamental traits that may lead to both higher performance and higher centrality?
To address these questions, we develop a computational agent-based model-first introduced in Chang and Harrington (2005) for the homogeneous agents case-with several significant features.
2 First, we consider learning in a generic problem-solving environment. Rather than tailor the model to a particular setting, the intent is to derive some basic properties of networks that are broadly applicable. Second, the model allows the network to be endogenously formed through the decisions of individual agents regarding with whom they form links. In this way, we can assess the regularity with which connectors emerge.
Third, agents are modelled as allocating effort between innovation-discovering new ideas in isolationand imitation-linking with other agents to learn what they know. Our model, then, allows for both knowledge transfer and creation; furthermore, these processes are intertwined, as agents can take new ideas they come up with and put them together with the ideas of others to derive a new solution to a problem. Fourth, agents are heterogeneous in terms of their innovative and imitative skills. Specifically, the population is comprised of three types: Innovators are highly productive in generating new ideas, imitators are highly productive in identifying the ideas of others, and regular agents are moderately productive at both activities. Such heterogeneity in skills, of course, has the first-order impact on the choices made by individuals in terms of the learning mechanism used for solving problems-innovation versus imitation. However, more importantly, the extent of the skill differentials and the distribution of the heterogeneous skills within the population tend to shape the architecture of the networks that evolve-i.e., who learns from whom and with how much intensity. This feature of our model, hence, allows us to explore both how the emergence of connectors depends on the distribution of the types as defined above and what the fundamental characteristics of connectors are when they do emerge in the networks. The relative contribution that innovators and imitators play in the performance of the overall population in solving problems can also be assessed in this framework.
Finally, we consider the interactions of the two learning mechanisms-innovation and imitation-in an environment within which the nature of the problem to be solved changes from one period to the next at some fixed rate. In a product market setting, a firm's problem changes with what its competitors are doing, as well as with consumer preferences. Thus, a more volatile environment means that competitors and consumers are less stable. Or, if the problem is to find a new vaccine, environmental volatility corresponds to the rate of mutation of the virus. Such volatility in the problem-solving environment determines the rate at which newly adopted ideas become obsolete over time, which, in turn, affects the value to an agent of learning through innovation relative to that of learning through imitation via network. The endogenous formation of networks and the emergence of connectors in the population are then directly influenced by the degree of stability in the problemsolving environment.
There are several significant findings. First, connectors do indeed naturally emerge and, in addition, it is imitators that assume this role and act as conduits between innovators and regular agents. That is, rather than directly connecting to innovators, regular agents evolve to connect to imitators to learn new information. That some agents have high centrality is then an emergent property and a decentralized process-i.e., one in which each individual agent adjusts his or her network connections autonomously-results in those agents who are best equipped to be connectors taking on this task. In exploring the socially optimal mix of types, group performance is maximized when there is a mix of innovators and imitators. This result is important, as it shows that certain agents-who are not themselves a source of innovation-can be critical in problem-solving networks.
We also derive results concerning the circumstances under which a network structure with connectors can be expected to emerge. Here, we focus on environmental stability as a driving factor, which is represented as the rate of change of the problem that agents are trying to solve. We find that connectors are less likely to emerge when the environment is less stable. When the environment changes rapidly, the returns to regular agents of connecting with imitators tend to be low, as the ideas of imitators available for copying come from a biased sample that is no longer suited for the new environment (that is, the new problem to solve). They are better off generating the ideas themselves, and this leads to an underdeveloped network with a diminished role for connectors. Hence, the issue of identifying who are critical connectors and maintaining them in the network is more important in more stable environments.
In concluding this introduction, let us relate this paper to two literatures. First, there is the work on learning in networks (some of which was mentioned above). As noted in the review article of Podolny and Page (1998) , there are two ways in which networks can enhance learning. First, there is the diffusion of new ideas, for which there is a considerable body of work examining diffusion networks (e.g., the classic work of Rogers 2003) . This work typically takes the network as fixed and explores how the structure of the network impacts the rate of diffusion of a given innovation. Second, new knowledge can be created by bringing together information at different nodes of a network. Work encompassing that feature is rare, although there has been some recent work related to the model of this paper (for a review, see Chang and Harrington 2006) . Both of these learning forces are present in our model. Furthermore, our model is unique in that it endogenizes both the network and the innovation. In fact, as described above in the context of knowledge sharing and creation, innovations are themselves a product of the network that helps diffuse them.
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Within the literature on learning in networks, research in sociology is rich in empirics, although formal modelling is rare. There is, however, an extensive theoretical literature on networks in economics (for a review, see Jackson 2006) . The subset of this work that is concerned with the dynamics of network formation (for a review, see Goyal 2005 ) is distinct from our approach in a substantive way. Economic models assume that the value of a particular network structure is fixed and explore how agents adjust their links to form a better network. In contrast, the value of a given network is endogenous in our model, because it depends on what agents know, and what is known evolves over time because of innovation and imitation through the network. The economic model is more appropriate for networks such as friendship, while ours is more designed to address problem solving. Alternatively stated, the learning that occurs in economic models is about what is the right network. In our model, there is that sort of learning as well, but there is also learning about how to solve a problem; it is noteworthy that the two learning processes are intertwined.
As our model encompasses the decision about whether to exert effort on innovation or imitation, it is also relevant to the literature on exploration and exploitation. The crux of that literature is understanding what determines whether agents engage in discovering new ideas or in exploiting existing ideas (such as through the diffusion of a new idea) and to what extent agents engage in a socially optimal mixture of these activities. A classic paper here is by March (1991) , who assumes there is an organizational code that adapts over time and determines the relative rates of exploration and exploitation.
The code influences what agents do, but the code itself is also influenced by the actions of better-performing agents. Thus, the code is a device that passes along the better ideas but is also a product of what is being done. Our model gets inside the "black box" of the organizational code by replacing it with a network-agents do not learn from the code but rather from other agents through their endogenously created network. Although the role of the code is exogenous in March's work, the role of the network is endogenous in our model, because agents can decide how many resources to put into developing a network and how many into developing their own ideas. The exploration/exploitation trade-off is also examined in Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) , although their focus is on the role of the formal hierarchy (in the allocation of authority) in problem solving. We replace the formal hierarchy with its fixed links with an informal endogenous network, and thus address a different set of questions related to the properties of emergent networks and individual agents' roles in the network.
Another related work is Haas (2006) . In the context of transnational teams working on knowledge-intensive projects, she looks at the roles of "cosmopolitans" and "locals" in the process of acquiring and applying both internal and external knowledge to their teams. The exploration/exploitation trade-off is also behind one of the results, which is that the ideal team composition entails a mix of both types.
The model is described in §2, and how we conduct our computational experiments is reviewed in §3. Results pertaining to the emergent properties of networks are presented in § §4 and 5. In §6, we address the issue of the optimal mix of agent types and relate these findings to the role of various agents in the emergent structure. Section 7 concludes by suggesting some managerial implications of our work and describing how our model can be modified to address other questions that have been raised in the literature on networks and organizations. The degree of heterogeneity between two methods vectors, z i and z j , is measured using Hamming distance, which is defined as the number of positions for which the corresponding bits differ. We shall denote it by D z i z j .
The Model
In period t, the population faces a common goal vector,ẑ t , which is also a binary vector of H · d dimensions. The degree of turbulence in task environments is captured by intertemporal variability inẑ t , the details of which are explained in §2.4.
The individuals are uninformed about the goal vector z t ex ante but engage in "search" to get as close to it as possible. Given H tasks with d bits in each task and the goal vectorẑ t , the period t performance of individual i is then measured by i t , where
Hence, the performance of agent i is greater as the Hamming distance to the goal vector is shorter. 4 The performance of a social system is measured by how close the individuals are to the common goal. We let t denote the aggregate social performance in period t such that it is the simple sum of L agents' performance levels in t:
Modeling Innovation and Imitation
In a given period, an individual's search for the current optimum is carried out through two distinct mechanisms: innovation and imitation. Innovation occurs when an individual independently discovers and considers for implementation a random method for a randomly chosen task. Imitation is when an individual selects someone (probabilistically) and then observes and considers implementing the method currently deployed by that agent for one randomly chosen task. Although each act of innovation or imitation is assumed to be a single task, this is without loss of generality: If we choose to define a task as including d dimensions, the case of a single act of innovation or imitation involving two tasks can be handled by setting d = 2d . 5 In essence, what we are calling a "task" is defined as the unit of discovery or observation. The actual substantive condition is instead the relationship between d and H , as an agent's innovation or imitation involves a smaller part of the possible solution when d/H is smaller.
Whether obtained through innovation or imitation, an experimental method is actually adopted if and only if its adoption brings the agent closer to the goal by decreasing the Hamming distance between the agent's new methods vector and the goal vector. For clarity, let us consider the following example with H = 5 and d = 2: common goal vector: 01 10 10 01 01 agent i's current methods vector: 01 01 11 00 11
The relevant operation has five tasks. In each task, there are four distinct methods that can be tried: 0 0 , 0 1 , 1 0 , and 1 1 . Agent i with the above current methods vector is then employing the method 0 1 for task 1, 0 1 for task 2, 1 1 for task 3, 0 0 for task 4, and 1 1 for task 5. The Hamming distance between i's current methods vector and the goal vector is four. Suppose i chooses to innovate in task 1. For task 1, agent i randomly selects a method from the set of all available methods, 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 . Let us assume that i comes up with the idea of 1 1 for task 1. The experimental methods vector for agent i is then agent i's experimental methods vector: 11 01 11 00 11, where the method 0 1 in task 1 is replaced with 1 1 . This raises the Hamming distance to the goal vector from four to five, and hence is rejected by the agent. Alternatively, suppose that agent i chooses to imitate and ends up observing the method used for task 4 by another agent j =i whose methods vector is agent j's current methods vector: 10 10 11 01 01.
Because j's method in task 4 is 0 1 , when it is tried by agent i, his or her experimental methods vector becomes agent i's experimental methods vector: 01 01 11 01 11, which then reduces the Hamming distance to the goal vector to three; hence, the experimental methods vector becomes i's new methods vector.
Endogenizing Choices for Innovation and Imitation
We assume that in each period an individual may engage in either innovation or imitation by using the network. How exactly does an individual choose between innovation and imitation and, if he or she chooses to imitate, how does he or she choose whom to imitate? We model this as a two-stage stochastic decision process with rein- Observe j = 2 Figure 1 describes the timing of decisions in our model. In stage 1 of period t, individual i is in possession of the current methods vector, z i t , and chooses to innovate with probability q i t and imitate with probability 1 − q i t . If the agent chooses to innovate, then, with probability in i , he or she generates an idea that is a randomly chosen task h ∈ 1 H and a randomly chosen method for that task such that the experimental method vector, denoted z i t , has the same methods as z i t in all tasks except for the chosen task h. The method for the chosen task h will be replaced with the randomly chosen method, as explained in the example provided in the previous subsection. This experimental vector is adopted by i if and only if its adoption decreases the Hamming distance between the agent and the current goal vector,ẑ t , in which case the methods vector in period t + 1 is the experimental vector, z i t . Otherwise, the experimental vector is discarded and the methods vector in t + 1 is the same as z i t .
6 Alternatively, when the individual fails to generate an idea, which occurs with probability 1 − in i , the methods vector in t + 1 remains the same as z i t . Now suppose individual i chooses to imitate in stage 1. Given that the agent decides to imitate someone else, he or she taps into the network to make an observation. Tapping into the network is also a probabilistic event, in which with probability im i the agent is connected to the network, while with probability 1 − im i the agent fails to connect. An agent who is connected then enters stage 2 of the decision process, in which he or she must select another agent to be studied for possible imitation. Let p j i t be the probability with which i observes j in period t, so j =i p j i t = 1 for all i. If agent i observes another agent l, that observation involves a randomly chosen task h and the current method used by agent l in that task, z h l t . Let z i t be the experimental vector such that it has the same methods as in z i t for all tasks except for task h, and the method in h is replaced with z h l t . Adoption or rejection of the observed method is based on the Hamming distance criterion, such that it is adopted if and only if it reduces the Hamming distance to the goal vectorẑ t ; the new methods vector in t + 1 is, hence, the experimental vector, z i t , in the case of adoption. Otherwise, it remains the same as z i t . Again, if the agent fails to connect to the network, which occurs with probability 1 − im i , the new methods vector remains the same as z i t .
The probabilities, q i t and p
t p L i t , are adjusted over time by individual agents according to a reinforcement learning rule. We adopt a version of the experience-weighted attraction EWA learning rule as described in Camerer and Ho (1999) . Under this rule, an agent has a numerical attraction for each possible action. The learning rule specifies how attractions are updated by the agent's experience and how the probabilities of choosing different actions depend on attractions. The main feature of the rule is that a positive outcome realized from a course of action reinforces the likelihood of that same action being chosen again.
Using the EWA rule, q i t is adjusted each period on the basis of evolving attraction measures, A in i t for innovation and A im i t for imitation. The following process drives the evolution of A in i t and A im i t . If the agent chose to pursue innovation and discovered and then adopted the new idea, the attraction measure for innovation increases by one after allowing for the decay factor of (0 < ≤ 1) on the previous attraction levelthat is, A in i t + 1 = A in i t + 1. If the agent chose to innovate but was unsuccessful (either because he or she failed to generate an idea or because the idea generated was not useful) or if the agent instead chose to imitate, then the attraction measure for innovation is simply the attraction level from the previous period decayed by the factor -that is, A 
where > 0. The parameter measures sensitivity of players to attractions. A high value of means that a single success has more of an impact on the likelihood of repeating that activity (innovation or imitation).
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The probability of imitation is, of course, 1 − q i t . The expression in (2) says that a favorable experience through innovation (imitation) raises the probability that an agent will choose to innovate (imitate) again in the future.
The stage 2 attractions and the probabilities are derived in a similar manner. Let B 
for all i and for all j = i where > 0.
8 Agent i's success in imitating another agent j then further raises the probability that the same agent will be observed again relative to others. There are two distinct sets of probabilities in our model. One set of probabilities, q i t and p j i t j =i , is endogenously derived and evolves over time in response to the personal experiences of agent i. Another set of probabilities, in i and im i , is exogenously specified and is imposed on the model as parameters. They control the capabilities of individual agents to independently innovate or to imitate someone else in the population via social learning. It is particularly interesting to understand how these parameters influence the structure and performance of the network.
Modeling Turbulence in Task Environment
If agents only faced one fixed problem, then eventually all would end up at the global optimum. In that case, the measure of performance is the speed with which the optimum is achieved. Although there are some problems like that-for example, the race for a drug-most organizations and societies face ongoing challenges. This is surely the case with business organizations, that face a series of problems, and the current problem that they are working on may change because of, for example, the actions of competing companies or technological advances in another industry. Rather than model agents as facing a fixed problem, we choose to model them as facing a series of related problems. For analytical tractability, this is done by allowing the problem itself to evolve stochastically over time. Performance is then measured by the average quality of the network's solution rather than simply by the speed with which a problem is solved. In addition, an important feature of a network ought to be how well it adapts to change and not simply how fast it solves a problem.
Change or turbulence is specified in our model by first assigning an initial goal vector,ẑ 0 , to the population and then specifying a dynamic process by which it shifts over time. In period t (including t = 0), all agents in the population have the common goal vector ofẑ t . In period t + 1, the goal stays the same with probability -i.e.,ẑ t + 1 =ẑ t -and changes with probability 1 − . The goal in t + 1, if different fromẑ t , is then an iid selection from the set of points that lie within the Hamming distance ofẑ t . The goal vector for the population then stochastically shifts while remaining within Hamming distance of the current goal. This allows us to control the possible size of the intertemporal change. The lower is and the greater is, the more frequent and variable is the change, respectively, in the population's goal vector.
This section provided a detailed description of the model. The definitions of the parameters introduced in this section and referred to throughout the paper are provided in Table 1 . The values of these parameters used in the computational experiments are also given in Table 1 . The notation for the relevant endogenous variables is provided in Table 2 .
Design of Computational Experiments
The underlying simulation model specifies that H = 24 and d = 4, so there are 96 total bits in a methods vector and more than 7 9 × 10 28 2 96 possibilities in the search space.
We assume a population of 50 individuals: L = 50.
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The population is divided into three separate groups: innovators, imitators, and regular agents. Let N represent (and denote) the group of innovators and M the group of imitators. The group of regular agents is denoted as R. There are 10 super types, such that N + M = 10 and R = 40. The baseline case we consider initially assumes the following configuration of capabilities for the agents in these three groups: No. of dimensions per task 4 Probability that the goal vector 0 5 0 7 0 8 0 9 stays the same from t to t + 1 Maximum no. of dimensions in 1 4 9 the goal vector that can change from t to t + 1 in i
Probability that agent i generates 0 0 25 0 5 0 75 1 an idea in any given period = 0 5 0 5 for all i in R. These extensions will allow us to check the robustness of the properties we identify in the baseline case.
We assume that the initial practices of the agents are completely homogeneous, so that z i 0 = z j 0 ∀ i = j. This is to ensure that any social learning (imitation) occurring over the horizon under study entails only newly generated knowledge. Otherwise, the initial variation in the information levels of the agents will induce some imitation activities, introducing unnecessary random noise into the system. 11 The common initial methods vector is assumed to be an independent draw from 0 1
Hd . The parameters affecting the endogenous variables are N M -the composition of the super-type individuals in the population-as well as and -the frequency and magnitude of the environmental changes for the population. Keeping the total size of the super types at 10, Probability that agent i observes agent j in t f rs Steady-state probability with which an average agent in group r observes an average agent in group s we consider the ratio of N M from 10 0 9 1 8 2 7 3 6 4 5 5 4 6 3 7 2 8 1 9 0 10 . We consider values of from 0 5 0 7 0 8 0 9 and from 1 4 9 . Additional parameters are (decay factor) and (sensitivity to attractions), which control the evolution of the attraction measures-that is, A All computational experiments carried out here assume a horizon of 15,000 periods. The time series of the performance measures is observed to reach a steady state by the 2,000th period. 12 We measure the steadystate performance of individual i, denoted i , to be the average over the last 5,000 periods of this horizon so that i = 1/5 000 All the experiments were based on 100 replications, each using a fresh set of random numbers.
13 Hence, the steady-state performance and probability measures reported are the averages over those 100 replications.
Results on the Evolving Architecture of Problem-Solving Networks: A Baseline Model
We start our analysis with the baseline case where = 0 25 0 25 for all i in R. Hence, innovators are true solitary geniuses who do not observe or copy other agents. The imitators are pure copycats with no ability to make independent discoveries. They rely exclusively on imitating someone else in the population through their networks. Finally, the regular agents have modest innate ability in both innovation and imitation.
In our model, the problem-solving network is defined in terms of the observation probabilities that the agents possess. Thus, we must examine the steady-state probabilities, p = 1, and N M = 4 6. The vertical frame indicates the identity of the observer (agent i) and the horizontal frame the identity of the target (agent j). The figure visualizes the complete sets of probabilities for all 50 agents by representing the size of a probability with the brightness of a cell. The brighter (darker) the given cell, the higher (lower) the corresponding probability. The diagonal cells are completely black, as an agent observes itself with zero probability.
The simulation that generated the output for Figure 2 specifies that agents 1-4 are innovators (group N ), agents 5-10 are imitators (group M), and agents 11-50 are regular agents (group R). One can immediately see that there is a unique structure to this network. The four innovators observe others (and themselves) with equal probabilities, which implies that their networks remain undeveloped throughout the entire horizon.
14 The six imitators (agents 5-10) observe the first four innovators with high probabilities, other imitators with somewhat lower probabilities, and the regular agents with the lowest probabilities. Regular agents (11-50) observe the imitators with high probabilities, the innovators with lower probabilities, and other regular agents with the lowest probabilities. This clearly suggests a chain structure to this network: Innovators engage in individual learning without any reliance on networks; imitators learn mainly from innovators; and regular agents learn mainly from imitators.
15 In this structure, imitators then play the role of connectors (between innovators and regular agents) by acting as the transmitters of ideas from innovators to the rest of the population. An alternative way of visualizing the chain structure is presented in Figure 3 , in which the networks consist of a set of nodes (agents) and links. More specifically, 50 agents (dots) are positioned along a circle. The four black dots on the upper part of the circle represent the innovators (agents 1-4), while the six grey-shaded dots on the lower part of the circle are the imitators (agents 5-10). The remaining hollow dots around the circle represent the 40 regular agents. A directed link (an arrow) is drawn from agent i to agent j if and only if the steadystate probability of observation, p j i , is greater than some prespecified threshold level of p. In Figure 3 , p = 0 05. Recall that a purely random network at t = 0 entails p j i 0 = 1/49 ≈ 0 0204 for all i and j (i = j). By assuming p = 0 05, we are defining a link from i to j as being significant if the network is sufficiently developed so that the steady-state probability of i observing j is greater than 0.05. Figures 3(a)-3(d) then capture the steady-state networks for when ∈ 0 9 0 8 0 7 0 5 . In fact, Figure 3(b) uses the same probability data that generated Figure 2 . The existence of the chain structure is quite clear. All the links coming out of the hollow dots (regular agents) are directed toward the grey-shaded dots (imitators). All the links out of the grey-shaded dots are directed towards the black dots (innovators) or to other grey-shaded dots. Furthermore, as decreases, the networks appear to be less well developed and the chain structure less pronounced.
How robust is this structural property, and how is it affected by the relevant parameters such as , , and the mix of the super types, N M ? Given the enormous size of the probability sets among which we must make systematic comparisons, we simplify our analysis by eliminating redundant information. Because the observation probabilities among agents belonging to the same group are similar, we compute the probability with which an average agent in a given group observes an average agent in another group. Let f rs denote the probability with which an average agent in group r observes an average agent in group s. Given three groups, N M R , we look for the probability with which an average agent in group g learns from an average agent in group g , where g ∈ N M R , g ∈ N M R , and g = g . Because an agent may also learn from other agents in his or her own group, we define two mean probabilities, f gg and f gg , as follows:
where g is the size of group g. There are then nine different mean probabilities to be computed. Define a matrix F as the probability matrix showing all nine of them:
For the baseline case, where innovators do not communicate at all, it is clear that f NN = f NM = f NR . This is because innovators start out with networks that are completely undeveloped-i.e., they observe others with equal probabilities-and they never get to develop the networks over the horizon. However, the imitators in group M and the regular agents in group R do develop their networks, and the steady-state probabilities that ultimately emerge for these agents depend on all three parameters considered in this paper, , , and N M . Shown in Figure 4 are the probability matrices, F , for ∈ 0 9 0 8 0 7 0 5 when = 1 and the N M = 4 6. As expected, we get f NN = f NM = f NR =1/49 ≈ 0 0204 for all cases. We also observe that f MN > f MM > f MR and f RM > f RN > f RR in all cases. The tendency for the network to take the chain structure is very clear: An agent in group M focuses mainly on observing an agent in group N , and an agent in group R focuses mainly on observing an agent in group M. It also appears that both f MN and f RM increase in , hinting at the possibility that the chainlike network structure is more pronounced in a more stable learning environment. 16 We have also examined these endogenous probabilities from various individual runs and verified that their properties are fully consistent with the ones from those averaged over 100 replications.
To confirm the generality of the properties observed in Figure 4 and to further explore the ways in which these probabilities respond to the changes in the parameter values, we resort to visualization of these probabilities in the next section. We focus on the observation probabilities of an imitator, f M· , and those of a regular agent, f R· but ignore the innovators because they do not develop their networks in the baseline case. Hence, an imitator observes an innovator with the highest probability, another imitator with a moderate probability, and a regular agent with the lowest probability.
Figures 6(a)-6(e) convey similar information on f RN f RM f RR and f RM − f RN , f RN − f RR . Both of the probability differentials plotted in 6(d) and 6(e) are again strictly positive for all values of N M and , which implies that f RM > f RN > f RR . A regular agent hence observes an imitator with a higher probability than he or she observes an innovator.
Figures 5 and 6 show that these properties hold for all and the N M mixtures considered in our simulations, given = 1. In a similar fashion, Figure 7 (for imitators) and Figure 8 (for regular agents) plot the probabilities and their differentials as functions of the N M ratio and , given = 0 9. Again, the previous properties hold for all N M ratios and all ∈ 1 4 9 . Although not reported here, these properties also hold for various population sizes. 
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Property 2. When the environment is more volatile, (1) imitators shift the probability of observation from innovators and imitators to regular agents, and (2) regular agents shift the probability of observation from imitators to regular agents.
The implication of Property 2 is that the chainlike network structure is more pronounced when the environment is more stable.
Having described our results concerning the network architecture for the baseline case, let us now dig deeper into the underlying mechanisms. What causes the network structure to evolve into a chain? Why do imitators choose to imitate innovators (rather than other imitators), while regular agents choose to imitate imitators (rather than innovators)? Why is this network structure more pronounced when the environment is more stable?
In contrasting the strategy of observing imitators with that of observing innovators, we must remember that these two agent types differ in terms of where their ideas originate.
19 Innovators make random draws from the entire space of ideas. Imitators make random draws from the ideas that are being used by others; those ideas are a mix of ones that have been selected and ones that are random (ideas that agents were endowed with and have not had a chance to change or those that are effectively random because they were adopted long ago when the environment was very different). If the environment is stable, the ideas of imitators should be better than the ideas of innovators, because the former type's implemented ideas come from a (favorably) biased sample. In contrast, when the environment is highly volatile, the ideas of innovators may be better because imitators' ideas come from an unfavorably biased sample, that is, ideas adopted for a different environment. One way to verify this claim is to examine the performance levels of a typical innovator and a typical imitator and see how they are affected by , the degree of environmental stability. The underlying motivation is that the level of an individual's performance is a direct indication of how well suited the implemented ideas are to the current environment. To this end, let us denote by k the average performance of a single agent in group k ∈ N M R such that k = 1/ k ∀ i∈k i We have examined M and N for ∈ 0 5 0 7 0 8 0 9 and for three typical super-type mixes, N M ∈ 8 2 6 4 4 6 . We found (as expected) that both M and N monotonically increase in so that 
a more stable environment raises the performance levels of all individuals. More interesting, however, is the performance differential between an imitator and an innovator. In Figure 9 , we plot M − N -the performance advantage an imitator has over an innovator-as a function of for the three different mixtures of the super types. Note that M − N is positive for all values of and N M , implying that a typical imitator tends to outperform a typical innovator in all cases. Most important for our analysis, this differential is greater for a higher value of for all three super-type mixes. Although a greater stability in the problem-solving environment benefits everyone, it benefits an imitator to a greater extent than it does an innovator. This result then is consistent with the "biased-sample" argument presented earlier.
The above logic explains why regular agents prefer to imitate imitators when the environment is relatively stable-that is, close to one. When the environment is more volatile ( low), note from Figure 6 (a)-6(c) that regular agents imitate imitators less and other regular agents more, but they do not necessarily imitate innovators more. The biased-sample argument explains why regular agents imitate imitators less when the environment is more volatile. As to why they observe other regular agents more, it is useful to note that the network of a regular agent is less well formed when the environment is more volatile. Because they have a modest ability to innovate, they tend to shift probability from imitation to innovation when is lower. Figure 10 verifies this by plotting the steady-state probability of innovation, q i , for a regular agent as a function of N M ratio for all ∈ 0 5 0 7 0 8 0 9 : q i , monotonically increases for all values of N M , as is lower. This implies that regular agents spend less time developing 
their social networks when the environment is more volatile. The underdevelopment of the networks for regular agents explains why the links to other regular agents are stronger in a more volatile environment. But then why do regular agents not imitate innovators more (rather than imitators)?
20 There are two counteracting forces in this case. The sample bias argument for imitating imitators suggests that regular agents ought to move from imitating imitators to imitating innovators when is lower. The countervailing force is the underdevelopment of the regular agents' networks, which tends to shift the probability mass toward being uniform across all links.
The final property to be explained is why imitators prefer to imitate innovators rather than other imitators. Here it is important to recall that there are two conditions required for a particular round of imitation to lead to the adoption of an idea. First, the identified idea of another agent has to be worthwhile. Second, it cannot be an idea that an agent has already seen. As regular agents have a low rate of imitation-both because they are less productive when they do choose to imitate and because they also engage in innovation-it is relatively unlikely that they will see the same idea again. However, that is not necessarily the case with imitators. They imitate at a high rate, and if one were to imitate other imitators a lot, they may see the same ideas over and over again. In contrast, this is much less likely to occur when imitating innovators.
To summarize, regular agents imitate imitators because their ideas are better as a result of those ideas coming from a biased sample-ideas that have already met the approval of another agent; innovators draw their ideas randomly (although with both agent types, adoption is based on the idea's quality). Imitators imitate innovators because they are more likely to find new ideas, while imitating other imitators is likely to generate repetitive ideas. Thus, imitators look to innovators to get fresh ideas, and regular agents look to imitators to get good ideas. These tendencies are stronger when the environment is more stable.
Impact of the Innovator/Imitator Mix
From Figure 5 we note that, for all values of , f MM monotonically increases, while f MN and f MR monotonically decrease in the N M ratio. The intensity with which an imitator focuses his or her attention on an innovator, f MN , tends to diminish as the number of innovators relative to imitators increases. The freed-up attention now goes to observing other imitators who have the favorably biased sample of ideas from an increasing number of innovators: Imitating imitators now becomes increasingly attractive because the risk of picking up redundant ideas goes down, as there are more innovators and less imitators. Consequently, f MN − f MM , the extent to which an imitator imitates an innovator rather than another imitator, monotonically declines when there exists a greater proportion of innovators in the population. Similar observations can be made from Figure 6 , which captures the probabilities of a regular agent: f RM rises in the N M ratio, while f RN and f RR are nonmonotonic (U shaped) in the ratio. We observe in Figure 6(d) that f RM − f RN , the extent to which a regular agent observes an imitator rather than an innovator, monotonically increases in the N M ratio. The intuition is same as before.
Figures 7 and 8 provide further support for these results for various values of . In the context of the chain network structure in which imitators learn from innovators and regular agents learn from imitators, it is then clear that the importance of a super-type agent (an innovator or an imitator) is positively related to its relative scarcity in the system. When there is a decline in the relative availability of innovators in the social system, an average imitator observes an average innovator with a higher probability. This is because the ideas held by the imitators tend to be redundant and the return to sampling an idea of an innovator is comparatively higher. Conversely, when there is a decline in the relative availability of imitators in the social system, an average regular agent observes an imitator with a higher probability, because the risk of getting redundant ideas is less.
Robustness
All of the results presented here for the baseline case have also been replicated for alternative cases: (1) 
Results on the Network Architecture When Innovators Can Imitate and Imitators Can Innovate
We will now diverge from our baseline model and consider agent types that are more balanced. Let us endow innovators in group N with some ability to imitate and imitators in group M with some ability to innovate: = 0 25 0 25 for all i in group R. Galileo undoubtedly had some ability to network with his contemporaries and Mersenne surely had some ability to innovate and make discoveries on his own. 21 How is the architecture of problem-solving networks affected by the availability of alternative learning mechanisms for the super-type individuals? As mentioned in §4.3, all the results presented for the baseline case hold with this extension. However, there is an additional result with implications for the architecture of the network. Unlike our earlier case, innovators and imitators now tend to communicate directly with each other. While imitators continue to connect to innovators to imitate their ideas, innovators prefer to connect to imitators rather than other innovators. Not only do imitators serve their usual purpose, but they are now also sought after by innovators, who find that connecting with them is more productive than connecting with fellow innovators. The above property is demonstrated in Figure 11 , which plots the differential probabilities of f NM − f NN , f MN − f MM , and f RM − f RN as functions of N M ratio for ∈ 0 9 0 8 0 7 0 5 , given = 1. Both f NM − f NN and f RM − f RN are positive for most values of N M and , but tend to decline with .
22 Focusing on when is high, we need to explain why regular agents and innovators choose to imitate imitators, while imitators choose to imitate innovators. The argument stated previously in the baseline case also explains why regular agents imitate imitators and imitators imitate innovators. The reason that innovators imitate imitators is the same reason that regular agents do-imitators have better practices (due to a favorably biased sample) and, because innovators (like regular agents) do not engage in as much imitation, there is less of a concern of rediscovering the same ideas.
When is low so that the environment is volatile, we need to explain the difference between innovators and regular agents-regular agents continue to imitate imitators more than innovators, while innovators do not seem to distinguish between imitators and innovators; note that Figure 11 (a) shows f NM − f NN 0 for low. One possible explanation is that the networks of innovators are less well formed than those of regular agents. Because innovators engage in more innovation than regular agents, this necessarily means less imitation, and it is the act of imitation that leads to a well-formed network.
Socially Optimal Mix of Innovators and Imitators
Having established the central role that imitators play in the evolving networks, we now explore the socially optimal mix of super-type agents. 23 Given that the innovators are the ones generating new ideas and thus providing raw materials for progress, is the social system best off with the super types consisting solely of innovators, or is it better off with some heterogeneous mixture of innovators and imitators? Furthermore, how is this optimal Figure 12 captures the steady-state aggregate performance, , as a function of the N M ratio for ∈ 0 9 0 8 0 7 and = 1. It is clear from the figure that the aggregate performance is nonmonotonic in the mix, with N M = 5 5 emerging as the social optimum. The nonmonotonicity of is robust in that we observe the same property for all ∈ 0 5 0 7 0 8 0 9 and ∈ 1 4 9 . Although the optimal mix of 5 5 is invariant to modest changes in parameters, we have found that large changes in parameter values can cause it to range from 7 3 to 4 6. What is always the case, however, is that the optimum has a mix of innovators and imitators. The configurations of super types consisting solely of innovators 10 0 or imitators 0 10 produces strictly inferior aggregate performance. Why is it that a mix of innovators and imitators is socially beneficial? What causes the marginal social gain from an additional imitator to outweigh (be outweighed by) the marginal social loss from one less innovator when the ratio of innovators to imitators is relatively high (low)? We conjecture that it is due to the fact that the imitators, in the course of imitating others, unintentionally play the role of integrating the distributed knowledge in the social system. Note that the baseline case involves innovators, who are only capable of generating new ideas. Imitation is done by imitators and regular agents. While the new ideas are generated by innovators, these original ideas are scattered among them. An average agent must observe a relatively large number of innovators to find a set of valuable ideas. However, given their superior abilities to imitate others, imitators easily observe and copy many of the valuable ideas that are distributed amongst the innovators. When N M , an average imitator comes to be in possession of a wide variety of ideas originating from a relatively large number of innovators, thereby making it more productive for an average agent to observe a single imitator than to observe the original sources. Hence, the imitator facilitates efficient dissemination of valuable ideas within the social system. The determining factor for the social optimum is then the balancing of two forces: generation of new ideas by innovators and dissemination of existing ideas by imitators. When N M , the relative value of dissemination is important, because the marginal social gain from an additional imitator outweighs the marginal social cost of one less innovator, and social performance improves. Once the proportion of imitators exceeds a threshold level, there is now insufficient generation of ideas within the social system; the marginal social value of an innovator outweighs that of an imitator, leading to a decline in the aggregate performance. The socially optimal mix is then strictly interior.
We take a step toward confirming the conjectured role of imitators by investigating how the performance at the individual level for each type is affected by the mixture of the super types. To that end, we examine the average performance of an individual agent belonging to each type. Figure 13 captures the individual-level performance for each type as a function of the N M ratio, given = 0 9 and = 1. Figure 13 R depend on the mix: The performance of an average imitator, M , is monotonically decreasing in the relative proportion of the imitators to the innovators, while the performance of an average regular agent, R , is nonmonotonic in the ratio. Intuitively, an average imitator loses when the proportion of innovators in the system decreases, because the sources of new ideas are drying up (and, simultaneously, the amount of redundant ideas is increasing). This implies that the dominant drivers of the imitators' performance are the ideas directly supplied by the innovators. In contrast, an average regular agent initially benefits from having additional imitators in the system when there is a relatively small number of imitators. Once the proportion of imitators to innovators reaches a certain level, replacing more innovators with imitators tends to depress a regular agent's performance. This is where there exist an insufficient number of original ideas and an excessive number of redundant Finally, it is a notable property of Figure 13 that imitators outperform not just regular agents, but also innovators.
24 Indeed, the differential between an imitator and an innovator is about the same size as that between an innovator and a regular agent. The superior performance of an imitator is consistent with the empirical finding of Sparrowe et al. (2001) , that people with higher centrality have higher performance.
Concluding Remarks
This research was motivated by the finding in the organization science literature that interpersonal networks and the presence of connectors within such networks are instrumental to attaining superior organizational or social performance. In this paper, we proposed to take a step back from this accepted wisdom and ask a more fundamental question in the context of decentralized problem solving: Do connectors endogenously emerge in an organization or social system when a population of autonomous agents can individually choose to innovate (engage in solitary learning) or imitate (engage in social learning by establishing and developing network links to other agents)? Given that an individual's choice depends on his or her skills with regard to innovation and imitation, as well as the volatility of the environment, which impacts the relative returns to those two activities, we further posed the question of how the distribution of skills among agents and the stability of the environment determine the architecture of the network as well as the relative importance of connectors within them.
When the population contains superinnovative and superimitative individuals who are fully specialized (the baseline case), we find that the architecture of problemsolving networks evolves into a chain: Innovators generate ideas, imitators learn from innovators, and regular agents learn from imitators. The overall flow of knowledge then entails imitators acting as connectors between innovators and regular agents. When the superinnovative individuals have the capacity to imitate and the superimitative individuals have the capacity to innovate, we find strong mutual interactions between innovators and imitators. Imitators learn from innovators, but innovators (as wells as regular agents) learn from imitators. In both cases, the importance of imitators within the network comes from their ability to integrate dispersed knowledge in the social system. Their role as a repository of knowledge improves the efficiency of search by individual agents, thereby leading to their centrality in the emergent network.
One of the main parameters considered in this paper was the composition of the super-type group. Their importance in the social network was found to be directly affected by their relative scarcity in the population. The network architecture was also shown to be affected by the volatility in the task environment. A more stable task environment is more likely to lead to the emergence of a chain network structure with imitators as connectors. Finally, social performance was maximized when there was a heterogeneous mixture of innovators and imitators. This result directly confirms the complementary relationship between innovators and imitators-innovators as the generators of new ideas and imitators as the disseminators of those ideas.
Although the model is parsimonious and generic in design, the ensuing theory does offer some useful insights for organizations. First, prospective employees should be evaluated not only on their ability to come up with novel solutions (as with our innovators) but also on their ability to understand, distill, and communicate the solutions of others (as with our imitators). A highperforming network requires both agents who create and agents who communicate. Second, given the role for both of those attributes, it can be more disruptive to lose an employee who is a connector than to lose one who is an innovator. With the loss of any employee, the remaining agents must adapt their links in the network because one source of those links has disappeared. Given the chain structure of the network-imitators connect to innovators and most other agents connect to imitatorsthe loss of a connector requires the vast population of agents to reestablish their links, and it can be a slow process to form the new network. In contrast, the loss of an innovator means that connectors must reestablish their links and-this is the good news-connectors are effective at doing that, because they are effective in communicating with other agents. While no organization can expect to make long-run improvements without new ideas, our theory highlights the importance of retaining those who disseminate ideas rather than those who create them, when the priority is in avoiding short-run deterioration of performance. Finally, the importance of retaining connectors is greater when the organization faces a more stable environment. In the context of business, firms facing competition from rival firms in the market, a relatively steady market with few firm turnovers is likely to provide a stable environment for the agents in the firms. As shown in our study, this gives rise to the emergence of a more chainlike network structure within a firm. Because those individuals with superior skills in disseminating ideas are particularly important in relatively stable environments, firms need to pay special attention to retaining them more than those who are superior in generating ideas.
1 "Our study offers evidence of at least three enduring relational characteristics that are predictive of the behavior of information seeking: (1) knowing what another person knows, (2) valuing what that other person knows in relation to one's work, and (3) being able to gain timely access to that person's thinking." 2 In the context of organizational learning, Siggelkow and Rivkin (2005) utilize an agent-based modelling approach that is similar to ours. Their focus, however, is on the issue of formal organizational design in the presence of environmental turbulence and complexity. 3 Our network is most closely related to what some scholars call an "advice network," though it is richer in that it allows for knowledge creation, not just knowledge sharing. 4 The problem for an agent may be viewed as that of search over a landscape defined on an (H · d + 1) dimensional Euclidean space, with the final dimension indicating the performance of the agent. Our model then implies a nonlocal search on a single-peaked smooth landscape, because each experiment (a blind step on the landscape) via innovation or imitation entails changing up to d bits in one of the H tasks, and the performance depends only on the Hamming distance between the agent's methods vector and the goal vector. If one were to assume complex interactions among various tasks so that the performance contribution of a method chosen for a task depends on the methods used in other tasks, then the search landscape will be rugged with multiple local optima. (See Chang and Harrington 2006 for a survey of models using this approach.) Given the many diverse features of our model (including the environmental turbulence), how the results obtained in this paper will be affected by the degree of complexity (i.e., the ruggedness of the landscape) is an open question. 5 There is a restriction in that an agent only has the option of adopting all d dimensions or none. 6 Implicit in the adoption rules used in our model is the assumption about what agents know about their environment. We do not believe that they have complete information about the performance level associated with the proposed methods vector, but rather that they can experiment to get a reasonable estimate of it. Instead of modelling this process of experimentation, which would further complicate an already complex model, we implicitly assume that it is done instantly and without cost. 7 For analytical simplicity, we assume that and have the same value for all agents in the population. 8 For simplicity, we assume that the sensitivity parameter, , is the same for both q i t and p j i t . 9 It should be noted that the network and the imitation behavior of an agent are mutually interdependent in this setting. A network in our model is defined by the probabilities with which an agent observes other agents in the population. To the extent that agent i has probability p j i t of observing another agent j in period t, the network determines the imitating behavior of agent i in that period. However, another main feature of our model is that these imitation probabilities are updated on the basis of how successful agent i's attempt to imitate j j = i was, so the imitating behavior of an agent also affects his or her network. 10 Selecting the parameter values for our computational experiments is driven by the constraints imposed by the limited computational resources. L = 50 was the largest population size that we could realistically work with, given that each of these agents maintains a set of observation probabilities for 49 other agents, which are continually updated from one period to the next over a horizon of 15,000 periods. It should be noted, however, that we performed additional simulations for L ∈ 20 30 40 and confirmed that the qualitative results reported in this paper for L = 50 have all been replicated for those values of L.
